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Matched Data
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We study the relation between workers’ skill dispersion and firm
productivity using a unique data set of Italian manufacturing firms
with individual records on all their workers. Our measure of skill is
the individual worker’s effect from a wage equation. We find that a
firm’s productivity is positively related to skill dispersion within
occupational status groups (production and nonproduction workers)
and negatively related to skill dispersion between these groups. Con-
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sistently, most of the overall skill dispersion is within and not between
firms. These findings are consistent with some recent hierarchical
models of the firms’ organizational structure.
I. Introduction
The factors driving firm productivity have been the subject of a good
deal of research over the years. Persistent substantial differences in pro-
ductivity across firms have been documented, and many empirical papers
have provided a deeper understanding of the connection between pro-
ductivity and observable characteristics of firms, such as size, technology,
innovative activity, and so forth. However, less is known about the way
firms’ outcomes are related to the characteristics of the workers they
employ. In this study, we focus on one aspect of workforce composition:
the skill mix. Using a newly created matched Italian employer-employee
data set, we examine the way in which firms’ productivity is associated
with the dispersion of skills within the firm.
The role of the skill distribution in determining firms’ performance
is intrinsically related to the nature of the production function and
depends on the degree of complementarity or substitutability between
skills (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Some activities depend heavily on
the performance of a few workers (Rosen’s “superstars” [1981]), leading
to a dispersed skill distribution of the workforce; others require that all
tasks be performed at a certain level of competence, fostering the for-
mation of teams of workers with similar skill levels (Kremer’s “O-ring”
theory [1993]). There is a lively theoretical debate on whether and how
technological innovation has modified the optimal skill mix over the
recent past. On the one hand, some recent matching and sorting models
argue that production may have shifted from a mode in which firms
hire workers with different skill levels to one in which some firms use
mainly high-skill workers (Microsoft) and others only low-skill workers
(McDonald’s), resulting in low skill dispersion within firms and seg-
regation between them (Kremer and Maskin 1996). On the other hand,
hierarchical models of the firm organizational structure suggest that, to
the extent that improvements in information and communication tech-
nologies reduce communication costs, they might also increase the op-
timal degree of skill dispersion (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2006).
While the theory behind the role of skill dispersion in firm performance
is fairly well developed, the evidence is scant, due to the heavy data
requirements. Our goal in this study is to empirically assess the impact
on a firm’s productivity of its workers’ skill mix. More precisely, we ask
whether there are productivity effects derived from the particular com-
bination of workers’ skills and, if so, whether workers’ skills are com-
plementary or substitutable. We address this question using a new matched
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employer-employee data set that is representative of Italian manufacturing
firms with at least 50 employees, that covers almost 20 years (1981–97),
and, most importantly, that includes individual information based on so-
cial security records on all the workers of each firm in the sample.1 We
have detailed information on the characteristics of the firms as well as on
workers’ demographics and compensation. This data set, comprising 10
million worker-year and 10,000 firm-year records, offers a unique op-
portunity to study the skill distribution within and between firms and its
role in production for a fairly long period and a representative sample of
firms.
The right measure of skills is quite controversial. The most common
proxies have been the educational attainment and experience, by them-
selves or as the basis for the construction of more sophisticated measures
of human capital. However, these are mostly measures of formal skills
that only imperfectly reflect innate differences in ability and informal
skills, such as accuracy on the job or communication ability. Alternatively,
some studies have used earnings as the proxy for skills, assuming that
workers are paid the value of their marginal product (see, e.g., Davis and
Haltiwanger 1991; Dunne et al. 2004). However, wages also entail an
important firm component that reflects such things as the firm’s com-
pensation policies, rent sharing, and workers’ bargaining power within
the firm. To overcome these problems, we use the worker fixed effects
obtained as a latent variable from a wage equation, as proposed by Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). This is a better measure of workers’ skills
because, by including the firm fixed effect in the wage equation, we control
for firm (and sector) idiosyncrasies; moreover, not only is it based on
observable characteristics but it also includes innate ability and informal
skills not reflected in these. In fact, this indicator is increasingly used in
the literature to construct human capital measures (Abowd, Lengermann,
and McKinney 2003; Haskel, Hawkes, and Pereira 2005).
With this measure, we first examine the distribution of workers’ skills
between and within firms. We compute the share of overall skill dispersion
accounted for by the between-firm component (the segregation index)
and its evolution from the early eighties to the late nineties, a period in
which important changes in the firms’ organization may have taken place.
This gives us an idea of the relative importance of between- and within-
firm skill dispersion and of any pattern over time. We then move on to
study the relation between productivity and skill dispersion at the level
of the firm directly. We estimate a generalized constant elasticity of sub-
1 Previous studies using individual worker information at the level of the firm
used either a small subsample of the total workforce of each firm (Kramarz,
Lollivier, and Pele 1996) or the total workforce of just one firm (Baker, Gibbs,
and Holmstrom 1994; Flabbi and Ichino 2001).
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stitution (CES) production function to recover the parameters governing
skill complementarity-substitutability which, as we show, are directly re-
lated to the second moments of the skill distribution. We also test for
changes in these parameters by performing the estimation for different
subperiods of the sample. The estimation is performed using the procedure
of Olley and Pakes (1996) as well as the extension of Ackerberg, Caves,
and Frazer (2006) to control for the endogeneity of inputs.
Our results are easily summarized. First, a variance decomposition ex-
ercise shows that most of the dispersion in workers’ skills is within and
not between firms: the between-firm component accounts for less than
20% of overall dispersion. Nor is there any evidence of an increase in
this share over time, as a tendency toward skill segregation would imply.
These results, robust to a number of checks, are in contrast with the
evidence from other countries, such as the United States, Britain, and
France, where some tendency toward segregation has been documented,
although based on less comprehensive data (Kramarz et al. 1996; Kremer
and Maskin 1996; Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Troske 1997; Dunne et al.
2004).
The production function estimates show that overall within-firm skill
dispersion has a positive impact on productivity. Distinguishing between
production workers (P) and nonproduction workers (NP), we find that
differences in their average skill levels tend to have a negative impact on
a firm’s productivity. While the relative imprecision of the estimates leaves
the ground open to further investigation, we interpret this as evidence
that P and NP workers are imperfect substitutes in production, in line
with the results of the vast literature that uses relative labor demand
equations to estimate such parameters (Katz and Murphy 1992; Ciccone
and Peri 2005). By contrast, within each group of workers, the dispersion
of skills, particularly that of NP workers, is clearly beneficial for pro-
ductivity: given an average skill level, it is preferable to have a mix of
highly skilled and low-skilled workers than a uniform group. The results
are robust to a number of checks. Furthermore, we find no evidence of
significant changes over time in the parameters governing skill substitut-
ability and, consequently, in the optimal way to combine skills within the
firm. This finding, in agreement with the flat segregation index obtained,
constitutes indirect evidence that in our sample there was no substantial
change in the production mode during the period.
We have termed the production mode implied by our estimates the
“Ferrari and Fiat” model. Ferrari and Fiat are both vertically integrated
firms and are therefore likely to have quite a highly dispersed skill dis-
tribution. At the same time, reflecting the different technological content
of the cars produced, Ferrari has both P and NP workers with higher
average skill than Fiat. Finally, our findings on the connection between
skill dispersion and productivity are consistent with a hierarchical or-
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ganization of production, where it is optimal to concentrate skills in
individuals with decision and supervisory power, on whom the firm per-
formance is heavily dependent. According to case studies in the managerial
literature, this is the organizational mode adopted by Fiat at least up to
the mid-nineties (Tronti 1997).
Some recent international evidence based on matched employer-em-
ployee data supports our conclusions. In particular, Lazear and Shaw
(forthcoming) in summarizing the findings of nine country studies on
wage dispersion within firms, conclude (among other things) that (i) in
all countries there is substantial within-firm wage dispersion, which is the
primary source of the overall dispersion, and (ii) this dispersion seems to
reflect workers’ skill heterogeneity rather than different compensation
policies across firms. These findings suggest that our results on the relation
between skill distribution and productivity might generalize beyond the
case of Italy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we review
the theoretical and empirical literature. Section III describes the data and
presents the estimation of workers’ individual effects. Section IV decom-
poses the variance of workers’ skills between and within firms. Section
V examines the relationship between within-firm skill dispersion and pro-
ductivity by estimating a generalized production function that allows for
heterogeneity of workers’ skills. Section VI concludes.
II. The Literature
There is a good deal of empirical research that examines the connection
between productivity and human capital at the national and local levels
but not, until recently, at the micro level of the firm. Using matched
employer-employee data sets, Abowd et al. (1999) for France, Haltiwan-
ger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999) for the United States, and Haskel et al.
(2005) for the United Kingdom investigate the relation between produc-
tivity and workers’ skills. All of them find that the most productive firms
have more skilled workers. Focusing on average skill levels within firms,
these papers implicitly assume that workers’ skills are perfect substitutes.
In reality, though, they may be substitutes or complements, in which case
not only the average level but also the particular combination of skills is
important. For example, Kremer and Maskin (1996) use a production
function where skills are complementary and where it is therefore optimal
to combine workers of similar skills.2 By contrast, there are activities in
which workers’ skills are substitutes and the performance of one subset
2 An extreme case of complementarity is given by Kremer (1993): an O-ring
production function where the value of the final product depends crucially on
the way every task is performed, so that failure at any stage jeopardizes the entire
project.
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of workers might be very important, as in the case of coordination and
supervision tasks.3 In this case, it is preferable to have teams with some
very talented workers, what Rosen (1981) calls “superstars.” These dif-
ferent modes carry precise implications for the relation between skill
dispersion and productivity and consequently constitute the basis for
extending the production function to include higher moments of the skill
distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the role
of skill dispersion on firm productivity for a representative sample of
firms.4
The production mode, and thus the optimal skill mix, might be altered
in response to certain changes in the economy. This is the idea underlying
Kremer and Maskin (1996) and Acemoglu’s (1999) hypothesis of segre-
gation of workers by skills between firms. Following changes in the supply
of skills (Kremer and Maskin 1996) and/or in technology (Acemoglu 1999;
Caselli 1999), production may shift from a pooling equilibrium in which
firms hire workers with different skill levels to a separating one in which
some firms use mainly high-skill workers (Microsoft) and others only
low-skill workers (McDonald’s), resulting in low skill dispersion within
firms and segregation across them.
The optimal combination of workers’ skills has also been analyzed by
models of firm hierarchies such as Rosen (1982) and, more recently, Gar-
icano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006). These models explain the exis-
tence of different occupational categories and hierarchies based on the
asymmetry of tasks, so that less skilled workers are assigned more stan-
dardized and routine tasks and high-ability workers perform more com-
plex ones. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) obtain positive sorting
between occupational categories: firms with high-skill managers also hire
high-skill (production) workers, while Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) also obtain “skill stratification” within occupational categories:
different hierarchically ranked layers coexist within the same firm.
On the empirical front, there is some evidence on segregation of work-
ers by skill, even if scant and based on coarse and questionable indicators
of skills. Dunne et al. (1997, 2004) use the share of NP workers as a proxy
for (high) skills and document secular increases in this share for all U.S.
manufacturing sectors from 1972 to 1988. Though it is a good proxy for
3 Grossman and Maggi (2000, 1255) argue that many of the goods and services
exported by the United States fall into this category, as they “reflect dispropor-
tionately the input of a few very talented individuals,” and they cite the software
industry and the financial services emanating from Wall Street as examples.
4 Abowd and Kramarz (forthcoming) present some reduced-form regressions
that include second moments of the ability distribution, finding inconclusive evi-
dence. Their results are not directly comparable with ours, as they estimate a
linear specification without controlling for the endogeneity of inputs and use a
different decomposition of workers’ skills.
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pure skill groups, the classification of workers into P and NP is too coarse
and does not reflect only differences in skill. These two types of workers
also perform fundamentally different tasks and often work in separate
units or departments. For example, in an automobile firm, a mechanic (P)
will be working at the assembly line while an engineer (NP) will be
working in the design department. At least in the short term, the pos-
sibilities of substitution between them are quite limited. We treat P and
NP workers as different types of labor, but we also consider heterogeneous
workers within each group.
Assuming that wages reflect workers’ productivity, Davis and Halti-
wanger (1991) and Dunne et al. (2004) use wages as an alternative proxy
for skills and analyze the dispersion of wages across and within U.S.
plants. But this proxy too is problematic, particularly when computing
measures of segregation such as Kremer’s index, which is the ratio of the
between-firm component of the variance of skills to the total variance.
As Abowd et al. (1999) argue, the between-firm variation in wages is
partly due to differences in firms’ compensation policies unrelated to
differences in workers’ ability and common to all workers in a firm. Thus,
ignoring this results in an upward bias in the between-firm component
of skill dispersion and, therefore, in the segregation index. Kremer and
Maskin (1996) also reproduce some evidence of skill segregation across
firms during the 1980s from studies in the United Kingdom and France.
The measure of segregation used is the within-firm correlation among
workers of different indicators of skill, such as occupational classification,
experience, and wages. This, as we have argued, can be problematic. More-
over, unlike ours, those studies are not based on individual records for
all workers within each firm.
This study also contributes to the empirical literature on the degree of
substitutability between skilled and unskilled workers (see, e.g., Katz and
Murphy 1992; Krusell et al. 2000; Ciccone and Peri 2005; Caselli and
Coleman 2006), to which our estimated elasticity of substitution between
P and NP average skills can be compared.5 Unlike all these papers, we
estimate the elasticity of substitution between P and NP workers directly
from the production function rather than from relative labor demand
functions, thus offering an important check to the robustness of these
results to the estimation procedure.
Finally, this study is also related to the literature that considers the
effect of wage inequality on firm performance, such as “tournament mod-
5 Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) argue that the classification of workers
into NP and P, which usually proxies for occupational status (white and blue
collar), is also a good proxy for the skill level of workers based on educational
attainment, as this classification shows trends similar to those found using edu-
cation.
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els” (Lazear and Rosen 1981), according to which wage dispersion is
beneficial for effort extraction, and to models that stress fairness and
cooperation (Akerlof and Yellen 1990), which predict the opposite. The
evidence from this literature is mixed.6 We are interested in skill rather
than wage dispersion. However, given that most papers do not control
for workers’ unobserved characteristics but only observable ones, part of
the effects attributed to residual wage dispersion might be due to un-
observed workers’ skills. Addressing this issue could be an interesting
direction for future work.
III. Sample Construction
Our empirical strategy is based on two sequential steps. In the first
step, we run a wage equation to compute an estimate of each worker’s
skills. In the second step, we use these estimates to compute the distri-
bution of skills within each firm, and run production function regressions
augmented with such measures of the firm-specific skill distribution in
order to assess the degree to which workers’ skills are complementary
within the firm. In this section we discuss the data and the proxy we
develop to measure individual-specific skills. In Section V.B, where we
carry out the estimation of the production function, we explain why skills
are imputed from a wage regression estimated independently of
production.
A. Data Description
The data used in this study were constructed from the Bank of Italy’s
annual INVIND survey of manufacturing firms. INVIND is an open
panel of around 1,200 firms per year representative of manufacturing firms
with at least 50 employees. It contains detailed information on firms’
characteristics (see below). The Social Security Institute (Inps) was asked
to provide the complete work histories of all workers who ever transited
in an INVIND firm for the period 1981–97, including spells of employ-
ment in which they were employed in firms not listed in the INVIND
survey. We have information on about a million workers per year, more
than half of whom are employed in INVIND firms in any given year.
The rest are employed in 100,000 other firms of which we only know
the unit identifier.
The data on workers include age, gender, area where the employee
works, occupational status (production, clerical, manager), annual gross
earnings (including irregular payments such as overtime, shift work, and
6 See, e.g., Winter-Ebmer and Zweimu¨ller (1999) for evidence on Austria and
Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx (2004) on Belgium; the latter paper contains a
comprehensive review of the recent literature. See also the contributions in the
book edited by Lazear and Shaw (forthcoming).
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Table 1
Workers’ Characteristics
Whole Sample INVIND Sample
Mean SD Mean SD
Weekly wage (i1995) 347.86 138.72 348.54 127.66
Age 37.14 10.00 38.44 9.95
Seniority 4.04 4.02 3.028 2.65
Share of males 79.2 77.6
Share of production workers 66.0 69.17
Share of nonproduction workers 32.7 29.93
No. of observations 17,593,816 9,559,271
Note.—Whole sample refers to all workers in the data set, independently from the firm they are
employed in; INVIND sample refers to workers that are currently employed by a firm that belongs to
the INVIND survey.
bonuses), number of weeks worked, and the firm identifier. As is always
the case with social security data, there is no information on education.
We cleaned the data by eliminating the records with missing entries on
either the firm or the worker identifier, those corresponding to workers
younger than 15 and older than 65, those who had worked less than 4
weeks in a year, and those in the first and last percentiles of the earnings
distribution.7 We also avoided duplication of workers within the same
year; when a worker changed employer, we considered only the job at
which he had worked the longest and computed weekly earnings ac-
cordingly. We use this data set to estimate the wage equation that identifies
the worker and firm fixed effects.
Table 1 shows the statistics on workers’ characteristics for the total
sample and for INVIND firms on which we base the analysis of Section
V.8 For the total sample, average gross weekly earnings at 1995 constant
prices are i350, and the average age is 37 years. Almost 80% of the
observations pertain to males, 66% to P workers, and 32.7% to NP work-
ers. The INVIND sample consists of almost 10 million observations. The
descriptive statistics are quite similar to those of the total sample, as they
contain the same workers but observed only when employed by an IN-
VIND firm.9
Attrition in INVIND firms is substantial: on average 10% of workers
7 Extreme values of the earning distribution could be due to exceptional events
(illness and the like) or to measurement error. Given that measures of dispersion
are very sensitive to such values, we decided to drop them from the analysis
altogether.
8 We base the analysis of dispersion and productivity on INVIND firms only
because these are the firms for which we have detailed information.
9 Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) report descriptive statistics for a dif-
ferent sample of workers, representative of the entire population of workers. The
characteristics are very similar to those of our sample of manufacturing firms with
at least 50 employees.
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enter and 12% exit the sample from one year to the next. Overall, ap-
proximately 80% of the workers in an INVIND firm in 1981 had dropped
out of the sample by 1997, and 72% of the workers in the 1997 sample
were not present in 1981. This implies that even if our measure of skills
is fixed over time, in principle the skill distribution could have changed
significantly due to turnover.
The INVIND survey gives an extensive list of firm characteristics, in-
cluding industrial sector, nationality, year of creation, average number of
employees during the year, value of shipments, value of exports, and
investment. In some years, additional questions were asked, for example,
one on organizational changes in 1995 and one on number of establish-
ments in 1992–95. We completed the data set with balance-sheet data
collected by the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS) since 1982,
from which it was possible to reconstruct capital series, using the perpetual
inventory method.10 Investment is at book value, adjusted using the ap-
propriate two-digit deflators, derived from National Accounts published
by the National Institute for Statistics. For consistency with the capital
data, in the estimation of the production function we take value added
and labor from the CADS database. Both the INVIND and the CADS
samples are unbalanced, so that not all firms are present in all years.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the firm data used in the re-
gression analysis. The first two columns are unweighted. On average,
firms employ 600 workers and hold a capital stock of i45 million; most
are located in the north of Italy. By sector, our data confirm the spe-
cialization of Italian manufacturing in industries with low technological
content. Only 7% are classified as high tech according to the OECD
system.11 The last two columns give sample-weighted statistics, which
makes the sample representative of the population of firms with 50 or
more employees. The average size is substantially smaller, as the survey
oversamples large firms. All the other characteristics are fairly similar to
the unweighted data.
Since we do not have plant level data, all our analysis is at the firm
level. From a theoretical point of view, it is unclear which unit would be
the most appropriate; arguments can be found for both the firm and the
plant level. However, as table 2 shows, between 2/3 (unweighted) and 4/
5 of the firms are single plants,12 suggesting that this is not likely to be
10 See Cingano and Schivardi (2004) for a detailed account of the procedure.
11 See OECD (2003) for the details on how the classification system is con-
structed.
12 The information on the number of plants was collected in the INVIND survey
only between 1992 and 1995. We completed the series for this variable by ex-
tending backward the oldest and forward the latest number of plants of each firm.
This procedure is not likely to introduce substantial bias for single-plant firms.
In fact, out of the 842 firms that report single-plant in at least one year between
This content downloaded from 134.83.1.242 on Tue, 19 Aug 2014 05:26:08 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Skill Dispersion and Firm Productivity 257
Table 2
Firms’ Characteristics
Unweighted Sampling Weights
Mean SD Mean SD
Value added 26.6 118.1 8.1 38.0
Investment 5.2 30.3 1.5 9.7
Capital stock 46.4 242.0 13.8 77.0
No. of workers 625 3,024 198 949
Average workers’ skills, s¯ .46 .09 .45 .08
Average P workers’ skills, Ps¯ .40 .08 .40 .08
Average NP workers’ skills, NPs¯ .61 .09 .60 .10
Variance of workers’ skills, 2j .036 .018 .034 .018
Variance of P workers’ skills, P2j .017 .012 .017 .013
Variance of NP workers’ skills,
N2j .054 .025 .055 .028
Between-status dispersion,
N P 2¯ ¯(s  s ) .052 .044 .048 .045
Sectoral shares:
Low tech .38 .41
Medium low .25 .26
Medium high .30 .29
High .07 .04
Geographical shares:
Northwest .44 .47
Northeast .25 .27
Center .20 .16
South .11 .10
Share of single-plant firms .63 .78
No. of observations 9,790 9,790
Note.—Value added, investment, and capital stock are in millions of 1995 euros. P stands for production
and NP for nonproduction workers. Skills are measured by the individual worker effects obtained es-
timating eq. (1). See OECD (2003) for the classification of sectors according to technological content.
a major issue in our data. In any case, we also check our results restricting
the analysis to just single plant firms.
B. Estimation of Worker Fixed Effects
According to Abowd et al. (1999) wages can be decomposed into a
component due to time-variant observable individual characteristics, a
pure worker effect, a pure firm effect, and a statistical residual, as follows:
w p X b v  w   , (1)it it i J(i,t) it
where the subscript i denotes the worker, t denotes time, and is theJ(i, t)
firm where worker i works at time t. The worker fixed effect, is thev,
component of wages due to the worker’s pure ability, irrespective of the
characteristics of the particular firm and net of the personal time-variant
characteristics included in the matrix of controls X. Likewise the firm
1992 and 1995, only 59 report more than one in other years, and 40 of these
report only two.
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effect, is interpreted as the component of wages specific to the firmw,
where the employee works and might respond to particular compensation
policies such as efficiency wages or rent sharing.
Panel data allow us to identify firm and worker effects as long as there
is enough mobility of workers across firms. Following Abowd et al. (1999)
and Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002), we maintain the assumption
of exogenous mobility conditional on the observables.13 Ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation of the fixed effects requires the computation of
the inverse of the matrix in (1), which has dimensionality equal to the
number of workers plus the number of firms plus that of the other co-
variates: in our case, 2,100,000 by 2,100,000. The methodology initially
used in the literature was based on approximative methods, consisting of
a two-stage procedure to estimate worker effects first and then, from the
resulting residuals, firm effects or vice versa (Abowd et al. 1999). We use
the direct method proposed in Abowd et al. (2002), which simultaneously
estimates worker and firm effects. The Abowd et al. procedure estimates
the full model in (1) by fixed-effect methods using the standard conjugate
gradient (CG) algorithm with preconditioning as described in Dongarra
et al. (1991). The identification strategy consists of first determining the
groups of connected workers and firms. A connected group comprises
all the workers ever employed by any firm in the group and all the firms
that any worker in the group has ever worked for. The connected groups
set the restrictions that allow for the identification of worker and firm
fixed effects. Once the groups are formed, we apply the algorithm to each
group. Uniqueness of the solution further requires setting either one
worker or one firm fixed effect equal to zero, so that the estimated effects
can only be interpreted in relative terms.
The first step of the estimation procedure was the identification of
connected groups.14 Due to the sample design, based on all workers for
medium-sized and large firms, our data set turns out to be one big con-
nected group: only 0.5% of the observations are disconnected. For com-
putational simplicity, we use only the largest connected group, which
contains 421,019 firms, 1,674,684 workers, and 3,651,000 distinct firm-
worker pairs (see descriptive statistics in col. 1 of table 1). The relatively
great mobility of workers (about 70% have more than one employer
during the period) allows the identification of firm and worker effects.
We estimated the wage decomposition of log weekly earnings into the
three components of equation (1). The matrix of time-variant individual
13 This assumption can be defended on the grounds that the conditioning set
controls for both worker and firm fixed effects, in addition to other time-varying
observables. Dismissing the exogeneity assumption would require setting up and
solving a selection model, a computationally unfeasible problem.
14 We adapted the code implementing the CG and grouping algorithms kindly
provided by Francis Kramarz.
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Table 3
Estimated Coefficients of the Time-Variant Personal
Characteristics
Coeffi-
cient SD
Age .02349 .0000261
Age squared .00024 .0000003
Dummy for production workers .52908 .0003147
Dummy for nonproduction
workers .45683 .0003149
Seniority .00063 .0000120
Note.—The omitted category is “managers.” Standard deviations cal-
culated according to the approximative method described in Abowd et
al. (2002).
characteristics, includes age, age squared, seniority,15 and occupationalX,
category, which changes for a substantial number of workers.16 The
worker effect is fixed over time. It captures unchanged personal attributes,
such as the unobservable worker’s innate ability, and observable char-
acteristics, such as formal education, under the reasonable assumption,
for Italy, that workers do not go back to school once they enter the labor
market. Unlike Abowd et al. (2003), we do not decompose the worker
fixed effect into the potentially observable (such as education) and unob-
servable (such as innate ability or propensity to exert effort) components,
because we do not observe education in our data set.17 As noted, the firm
effect reflects a firm’s compensation above the average for workers of
comparable characteristics and can be explained based on firm-specific
compensation policies or firm-specific skills. Finally, the regression also
controls for any trend or common time effect in wages by means of a
full set of year dummies.
The estimated coefficients of the covariates are reported in table 3. We
15 Our data on seniority is left censored as we do not have information on
workers prior to 1981. To deal with this problem, we took the workers for whom
we had information on their complete job durations, that is, the workers who
started and left jobs within the sample period. We estimated a job-duration model
based on all the available workers’ characteristics—geographical area, age, and
occupational status—and ran separated regressions for men and women. We then
used the estimated coefficients to compute predicted job durations for all the
workers in our first sample year, 1981. From their predicted job durations we
could impute the seniority in any given year.
16 The inclusion of this dummy variable does not remove the wage premia due
to occupational status but only the changes in wages due strictly to the reclas-
sification of occupational status in the course of the employee’s working life.
17 It would be interesting to distinguish between education and other unob-
served workers’ skills in order to determine the contribution of workers’ education
to skill dispersion within and across firms. However, such distinction is not
feasible with the present data set.
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Table 4
Correlation between Earnings, Predicted Values,
Firm Effects, and Worker Effects
SD y predxb effpers effirm
y .332 1
predxb .091 .605 1
(.00)
effpers .220 .798 .428 1
(.00) (.00)
effirm .120 .426 .131 .044 1
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Note.—y p log of weekly earnings in 1995 euros; predxb p
predicted value of time-variant personal characteristics; effpers p
worker effect; effirm p firm effect. Standard errors are in paren-
theses.
find the usual concave profile of earnings in age, and lower wages for
clerks and production workers than managers. Contrary to expectations,
seniority is negatively related to earnings, but the coefficient is extremely
low, with an elasticity of 0.06%. This might be due to the measurement
error embedded in our variable of seniority (see n. 15) and to the cor-
relation with age. Abowd, Kramarz, and Roux (2006), who estimate firm-
level seniority coefficients, also find small and often negative effects of
seniority in French firms.
We use worker fixed effects as the proxy for workers’ portable skills.
This improves on other proxies in the literature in a number of respects.
First, it is clean of firm and sector idiosyncrasies, such as the particular
compensation policies of the firm or union dominance. Second, it is a
comprehensive measure of skills that includes innate ability and informal
skills. Finally, given that the worker fixed effects are calculated on the
basis of workers’ wages over time and across firms, they are orthogonal
to time-specific and firm-productivity shocks, and they are suitable for
comparison throughout the period analyzed. Since in the estimation of
(1) we also control for seniority, our proxy of skills is net of seniority
effects. One could argue that returns to seniority in a firm supposedly
reflect learning on the job and should therefore be reflected in the measure
of skills. However, we chose to exclude seniority because, as shown by
Flabbi and Ichino (2001), wage changes related to seniority in the Italian
system are more likely to reflect automatic upgrades due to typical con-
tractual arrangements than to changes in skills.
Table 4 presents summary statistics and correlations between the dif-
ferent components of wages. As in Abowd et al. (1999), a significant part
of the variation in earnings is due to heterogeneity in worker effects: the
correlation between log earnings and worker effects is the highest, 0.8.
Firm effects play less of a role, with a 0.43 correlation with earnings. The
correlation between the worker and the firm effects is positive but very
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small (0.044), which is similar to Abowd et al. (1999) for the case of
French manufacturing.
Descriptive statistics of the skill distribution at the level of the firm are
included in table 2. On average, NP workers’ skills are 50% higher than
those of P workers, with a fairly low dispersion across firms (standard
deviations are around .09 for both types of workers). The within-firm
variance of skills is substantially higher for NP workers (.054 vs. .017).
One potential problem with our measure of skills is that they are af-
fected by estimation error. This can induce some bias when constructing
the firm-level indicators, particularly for dispersion, as they will reflect
both true heterogeneity across workers and also estimation errors. Esti-
mation error, though, is likely to be limited in our analysis. First, contrary
to most previous papers, we observe all workers in a firm, so that our
measures are not affected by sampling error. Second, we observe workers
for a fairly long period of time (the mean number of years in the sample
is 13.3 and the median is 15), which also helps mitigate the estimation
error.
IV. Dispersion of Workers’ Skills: A Decomposition Exercise
As discussed above, a body of theoretical work predicts the segregation
of workers by skill across production units following certain technological
changes and/or changes in the supply of skills. In this section, we un-
dertake a decomposition exercise of skill dispersion similar to that per-
formed for U.S. manufacturing (Davis and Haltiwanger 1991; Dunne et
al. 2004) and for other countries (Kremer and Maskin 1996).
Our variance decomposition improves previous works in two direc-
tions. First, we use worker fixed effects, which are a better measure of
skills than raw wages. Second, previous measures of within-firm disper-
sion have generally been based on a subsample of firms’ workers. Instead,
we observe the entire labor force of our firms and thus we can obtain
the actual measure of firm skill dispersion.
The total dispersion of skills in the labor force can be decomposed into
two components, the between-firm and the within-firm components:
N
2¯ ¯V p l 7 (s  s ) (2)B f f
fp1
and
N
2V p l 7 j , (3)W f f
fp1
where denotes the weight in total employment of firm f, is the overall¯l sf
average skill, while and are firm f ’s mean and variance of workers’2s¯ jf f
skills.
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Fig. 1.—Segregation indexes—share of between-firm skill dispersion on total dispersion
Kremer and Maskin’s (1996) index of segregation is the between-firm
component of the variance of skills relative to the total variance,
. An increase in the relative importance of the between-firmV /(V  V )B B W
component would constitute evidence of increased segregation of workers
by skill at the firm level. Figure 1 reports the index for all workers and
for P and NP workers separately.18 As can be seen, most of the dispersion
of skills takes place within and not between firms: less than 20% of the
dispersion is accounted for by the between-firm component. There is an
even more marked pattern for NP workers, for which the between-firm
share is always below 10%.
In terms of time patterns, we find no evidence of an increase in seg-
regation. Over the period 1981–97, the segregation index for all workers
and for NP workers is basically flat. The index for P workers increases
from less than 25% to around 30% between the early 1980s and the early
1990s, before declining to the values that had prevailed at the beginning
of the period.
These findings are in contrast with those reproduced in Kremer and
Maskin (1996), Dunne et al. (1997), and Dunne et al. (2004), who present
some evidence of increasing segregation in the United Kingdom, France,
and the United States. Moreover, the level of our segregation indexes is
much lower than those for American manufacturing. Such indexes are
based on the dispersion of wages across plants, while we use the estimated
18 For comparability, we include both clerks and managers among NP workers.
Our results do not change if we exclude managers.
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Fig. 2.—Segregation indexes—share of between-firm wage dispersion on total dispersion
worker effects as the measure of skills. Thus, in order to make our results
comparable, we recalculated the segregation indexes using wages (the log
of weekly earnings). Results are reported in figure 2. As expected, since
wages also include the firm effect common to all workers, the between-
firm component is now larger: it accounts for between 25% and 30% of
the total dispersion, approximately 10 percentage points more than in the
case of the dispersion of worker effects. Also with this index we find no
pattern of increasing segregation over time. A moderate increase in overall
segregation during the 1980s is followed by an equally moderate decline
toward the end of the decade and a flat pattern thereafter, particularly
after 1993.
One possible explanation of the lower degree of segregation that we
find in Italy compared to the United States is labor market regulation.
As argued by Dell’Aringa and Pagani (2007), the Italian nationally cen-
tralized collective bargaining system might limit cross-firm wage disper-
sion, as firms would tend to stick to the centrally bargained wage levels.
This would be consistent with the stability of the segregation index ap-
parent in figure 2 after 1993, when a wage protocol was signed, that
induced wage moderation and strengthened the degree of centralization
of the wage-setting process. The Italian segregation index based on earn-
ings is closer in value to those reported in Kramarz et al. (1996) for
France—0.36 in 1986 and 0.44 in 1992—where wage-setting mechanisms
are similar to those in Italy. Unfortunately, comparability with the French
indexes is not complete, as the French sample also includes service workers
and is based on firms with as few as 10 employees. Moreover, the French
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Fig. 3.—Segregation index—share of between-firm skill dispersion on total dispersion,
single plant firms.
indexes are based on an average of just 30 workers per firm in 1986 and
11 in 1992. By contrast, our analysis relies heavily on larger firms, with
50 employees or more, among which the within-firm dispersion of skills
tends to be more important than the between-firm component.
A further difference with respect to the U.S. studies is that we consider
segregation at the firm level rather than the plant or establishment.19 Al-
though we do not have plant-level data, it is possible with our data set
to identify the single-plant firms. Figure 3 reports the segregation indexes
based on single-plant firms only. The time patterns are basically the same
as those for the whole sample, indicating that the evolution of skill dis-
persion is similar across firms and plants. The only difference is that the
level of segregation is on average 5 percentage points higher for single-
plant firms, which implies that in multiplant firms the distribution of
skills is slightly smoothed out across establishments.
Considering manufacturing as a whole could mask important differ-
ences across sectors due, say, to technological differences. We recalculated
the segregation indexes for four sectoral groups according to the OECD
technological classification (OECD 2003). Figure 4 shows that even at
this lower level of aggregation there is no evidence of an increase in
segregation. If anything, it has decreased substantially in high-tech in-
dustries and somewhat in low-tech industries as well; only in medium-
high-technological industries has it increased moderately (from around
19 The French study by Kramarz et al. (1996) is also conducted at the firm level.
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Fig. 4.—Segregation indexes—share of between-firm skill dispersion on total dispersion,
by technological intensity.
10% to 13%). In terms of levels, the less technologically intensive sectors
display the highest segregation indexes. This is not surprising if we take
into account that it is easier for low-tech activities to physically separate
the different phases of production and outsource the simplest tasks while
more sophisticated industries require greater integration between the de-
sign (and other headquarter activities) and the production phase, making
skill segregation less viable.20 All in all, we find that, unlike other countries,
Italy shows no tendency toward increasing segregation of workers by
skill.
V. Within-Firm Skill Dispersion and Productivity
A. Workers’ Skills in the Production Function
Why do we not observe a phenomenon of segregation by skill between
firms in the Italian case? One possible explanation is that the structural
changes that should lead to skill segregation did not take place. The first
element we consider is overall skill dispersion. Kremer and Maskin (1996)
show that an increase in dispersion might lead to greater segregation
between production units. Figure 5 plots total skill dispersion for all
workers in our data set and for P and NP workers separately. In all three
20 The process of delocalization of the production phase to countries with
cheaper labor, while keeping in house the activities with a higher value-added
content, has indeed been prominent in Italian manufacturing in sectors such as
textiles and apparel.
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Fig. 5.—Overall skill dispersion (variance of worker effects)
cases we observe a moderate decline in overall dispersion, arguably due
to the increase in educational attainments, mainly the steady increase in
the share of college graduates. This finding indicates that the first potential
change that might increase segregation is absent over the period of
analysis.
We now consider the role of the skill mix in determining firms’ pro-
ductivity. In particular, we investigate whether, given a certain average
skill level, skill dispersion within the firm increases or decreases produc-
tivity. From a theoretical point of view, the answer is fairly straightforward
and rests on the parameters of the production function that govern the
substitutability/complementarity of skills. As explained above, there are
certain activities for which having workers with similar skills is preferable.
This is the case of Kremer’s (1993) O-ring production function, a process
consisting of different tasks in which each task must be performed at a
given level of competence for the project to attain full value. By contrast,
there are activities where workers’ skills are substitutable and output
disproportionately reflects the contribution of a few very talented people.
Activities such as research and innovation or design, where the achieve-
ment of a certain common goal is more important than the partial con-
tributions of every individual in the team, are examples of this type of
production processes. Another example is a production process involving
tasks of different importance, such as complex tasks of coordination and
supervision, together with more straightforward ones requiring less skill.
In such activities the marginal product of a talented worker is greater
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when matched with less talented ones and thus, for a given average skill
level, productivity is higher the more dispersed skills are.21
Although this points to an optimal skill mix for all firms using the
same technology, in practice we observe significant variation in within-
firm skill dispersion, in much the same way as there is significant variation
between production units in firm characteristics such as capital intensity,
size, and innovative activity, and in firm outcomes.22 There are various
reasons for such a variation in skill composition across firms. First, the
labor force in Italy is hardly mobile geographically, so the local skill
composition affects the availability and the relative price of skills. As a
consequence, we expect similar firms in different locations to employ
different skill mixes. Second, labor regulations and other adjustment costs,
particularly in the firm organizational structure,23 might prevent firms
from fine tuning their skill composition, again resulting in variation in
the skill distribution across firms. Finally, different managers might have
different opinions on the optimal way to organize production and choose
their skill mixes accordingly. It is precisely the between-firm variation in
skill mix and productivity that allows us to identify any relation between
the two.
The production function analysis addresses two issues. First, we study
the effects of skill dispersion on productivity. This question has not been
dealt with in previous empirical work on firm productivity, due to the
lack of data.24 Second, we investigate whether the role of skill dispersion
has changed over time: according to the theories surveyed above, ICT
and other innovations in the organization of production may have
changed the way workers are mixed in the production process.
To formally investigate the relation between skill distribution and pro-
21 These ideas are formalized in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) with the concepts
of supermodularity and submodularity.
22 In fact, in unreported regressions, we found that a significant fraction of skill
dispersion remains unexplained when conditioning on sector and observable firm
characteristics. Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (2007) also observe significant
firm heterogeneity along other dimensions of the workforce composition, which
tends to decrease as firms age, suggesting an adjustment process based on learning
and exit of mistaken firms, toward some “optimal” worker mix.
23 Ichniowski, Shaw, and Gant (2003) study human resource management pol-
icies in the steel-finishing lines. They find that organizational modes with different
efficiency levels coexist in different plants even within a highly homogeneous
production process. According to their evidence, based on field visits, the main
reason for which less efficient modes remain in production is that the “work
culture” of the plant is very persistent and can be a major obstacle to the adoption
of the best practices.
24 Iranzo (2003) investigates this relation at the city level, finding that a more
dispersed skill structure is beneficial for productivity.
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ductivity, we use the following generalized Cobb-Douglas production
function in capital and labor:
a by p A 7 K 7 [L 7 E(s , … s )] , (4)ft ft ft ft 1 Lft
where subscripts f and t denote firm and time, respectively; A is a Hicks-
neutral technological factor; and K and L are capital and number of work-
ers, respectively. The term represents the overall efficiencyE(s , … , s )1 L
of the labor force and depends on workers’ skill levels , ,s ip 1 … Li ft
and the way they are combined in different firms. As P and NP workers
differ not only in their average skill level but also in the type of tasks
they perform, we consider these two types of labor as distinct inputs.
More precisely, we treat the overall efficiency of the firm’s labor force as
a CES function of the efficiency of P and NP workers:
P NP P P P g NP NP NP g 1/gE(s , s )p [l # (E (s ))  l # (E (s )) ] , (5)
where is the vector of skills of workers in occupational statusjs jp
and is the share of workers of status j in the firm’s totalj jP, NP l p L /L
labor force. The elasticity of substitution between P and NP workers is
given by . The term is, in turn, a CES function of workers’j j1/(1 g) E (s )
skills within status j:
j1/rjL1 jj j rE (s )p s , (6) ij( )L ip1
with the elasticity of substitution of skills for workers of status j given
by . In other words, the parameters , and govern thej P NP1/(1 r ) g, r r
substitutability of skills. If , the elasticity of substitution between Pg ! 1
and NP workers is positive, implying complementarity (or imperfect sub-
stitutability) between the two types of labor. A parameter of wouldg 1 1
imply that P and NP workers are substitutable, in which case the isoquants
are concave and then only one type of worker would be employed with
the relative wages determining which one is to be used. This case is highly
improbable. At least in the short run, the possibilities of substitution
between the two types of worker are rather limited, because P basically
cannot do NP workers’ jobs and vice versa. In effect, all the available
estimates on this elasticity of substitution suggest that P and NP workers
are imperfect substitutes. Similarly, indicates whether skills within eachjr
occupational status are complementary ( ) or substitutes ( ). Asj jr ! 1 r 1 1
the above discussion on production processes has illustrated, within each
occupational status substitutability of skills is less implausible.
The importance of the dispersion of workers’ skills for total output
can be seen more clearly by rewriting expression (5) as a function of the
first and second moments of the skill distribution. Using a second-order
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Taylor series expansion, the expression for the overall efficiency of labor
can be approximated around the mean skill level as follows:
P NP 2¯ ¯1 (s  s )
P NP¯E(s)p s (g 1)l l
¯2 s
2 2P NP1 j 1 j
P P NP NP (r  1)l  (r  1)l . (7)
¯ ¯2 s 2 s
The first term in (7) is the overall skill mean, ; the second term containss¯
the between-occupational-status component, , weighted byP NP 2¯ ¯ ¯(s  s ) /s
the product of the shares of P and NP workers; while the third and fourth
terms are the within-firm dispersion of P and NP workers’ skills, re-
spectively, divided by the overall skill mean and weighted by their shares
in the total labor force. Using (7) and taking logs in the production
function in (4), we obtain:
P NP 2¯ ¯1 (s  s )ft ftP NP¯ln y p a  a ln K  b ln L  b ln s  (g 1)l lft ft ft ft ft ft ft[ ¯2 sft
2 2P NP1 j 1 jft ftP P NP NP (r  1)l  (r  1)l . (8)ft ft ]¯ ¯2 s 2 sft ft
Equation (8) differs from a standard production function because of
the term in brackets, which includes the first and second moments of the
skill distribution. If there are no interaction effects derived from the com-
bination of workers’ skills, then the dispersion of skills does not matter
for productivity: , and are equal to one, and only the averageNP Pg, r r
skill has an impact on productivity. In terms of the elasticity of substi-
tution discussed above, this means that workers’ skills are perfect sub-
stitutes for each other. By contrast, if , and differ from one, theNP Pg, r r
way skills are combined also matters for productivity. In particular, if a
parameter is larger than one, the dispersion of the related skills increases
productivity, as it is optimal to combine workers of different skill levels,
whereas if it is smaller than one, dispersion has a negative effect on
productivity.
Note that if we disregard the distinction between P and NP workers
and assume that workers differ only in their skill level, equation (8) sim-
plifies to
21 jft¯ln y p a  a ln K  b ln L  b ln s  (r 1) , (9)ft ft ft ft ft[ ]¯2 sft
where the parameter r now governs the degree of substitutability among
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all workers’ skills. We will also estimate equation (9) as a benchmark for
our main results.
B. Estimation Results
Before going into the estimation of (8) and (9), we report some pre-
liminary evidence on the relation between labor productivity and the
distribution of skills (fig. 6). Labor productivity is constructed as output
per worker, net of time and sectoral effects.25 We compute the average of
the variables for each decile of the productivity distribution and plot the
indexes of each variable with respect to the values of the first decile. The
first panel reports the relation between productivity and average skills.
As expected, more productive firms have workers with higher skills on
average. For example, firms in the last decile of the productivity distri-
bution have an average worker effect 25% greater than those in the first
decile. When the two groups are considered separately, the relation is very
similar for P workers and less strong for NP workers.26
The second panel of figure 6 plots firm dispersion of skills and its
decomposition in the within- and between-occupational status compo-
nents. More productive firms tend to have a more heterogeneous labor
force: firms in the last decile show a skill dispersion almost 35% greater
than those in the first decile. In terms of occupational status, there is a
clear contrast between the within-status components—positively related
to productivity—and the between-status component, which decreases
with firm productivity. This preliminary evidence thus suggests that skills
are complements between status groups and substitutes within them.
For a preliminary gauge of any change over time in the relation between
skill mix and productivity, figure 7 replicates the lower panel of the pre-
vious figure, splitting the sample into two subperiods: 1982–90 and post-
1990. The two graphs show very similar trends for the total and the single
components, indicating that there was no significant change between the
1980s and the 1990s.
Before turning to the econometric results, there is an issue regarding
our estimation exercise that deserves some discussion. As equation (8)
makes clear, individual wages are not independent from the particular
combination (match) of workers’ skills within the firm: certain combi-
nations might result in higher productivity, generating a rent that the firm
and the workers share. More specifically, skill complementarity implies
25 We have regressed output per worker on a set of year and two-digit sectoral
dummies and used the residuals as a measure of productivity.
26 Note that the index of overall average skills does not need to lie between the
two components. In fact, if both the average skill of P and NP workers increases
and so does the share of NP workers, then the overall skill level will increase by
more than the other two.
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Fig. 7.—Variance of firm-level skill distribution by deciles of productivity: pre- and post-
1990.
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that the productivity of each worker (and thus her wages) depends on
the skills of other workers in the firm as well. Therefore, in principle,
one should consider estimating the production function and the wage
equation jointly. However, that would require a theoretical model of job
matching between workers and firms and also a model of rent sharing
and thus negotiation of wages assuming different degrees of bargaining
power between the worker and the firm. Such a theoretical model is
beyond the scope of this study. Instead, we estimate the individual worker
fixed effects, our proxy for skills, from the simple additive equation in
(1).27
The main econometric problem in estimating equation (8) is that inputs
are a choice variable and thus are likely to be correlated with unobserv-
ables, particularly the productivity shock . This is the classical problemaft
of endogeneity in the estimation of production functions. To deal with
it we follow the procedure proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996).28 Using
a standard dynamic programming approach, Olley and Pakes show that
the unobservable productivity shock can be approximated by a nonpara-
metric function of the investment and the capital stock, .a p h(i , k )ft ft ft
We therefore include in the regression a third-degree polynomial series
in i and k and their interactions, which should approximate the un-
observed productivity shock and take care of the endogeneity issue.29aft
All the regressions include year dummies as well as 13 sectoral and four
geographical area dummies, and observations are weighted using the
sampling weights. In order to account for the problem of generated
27 The exclusion from eq. (1) of possible rents deriving from the quality of the
skill mix might bias the estimates of the workers’ fixed effect. This potential
problem, though, is lessened by the fact that the equation controls for firms’ fixed
effects. In fact, as long as firms’ skill composition is stable over time, any inter-
action effects of workers’ skills on wages will be captured by the firm effect. In
some unreported regressions we have verified that most of the variation of the
skill composition is cross sectional and that the firm skill composition tends to
be persistent over time. Firm fixed effects alone explain almost 90% of the var-
iation in the within-firm skill dispersion. Similarly, the first-order autocorrelation
coefficient of within-firm dispersion is .95, which implies a substantial degree of
persistence.
28 Ideally, one would like to have instruments for the skill distribution. Un-
fortunately, it is very hard to come up with variables that are correlated with
skills at the firm level while orthogonal to productivity shocks. For example,
educational attainment in the local labor force will shift the skill distribution but
is also likely to be correlated with the unobserved component of productivity via
human capital externalities.
29 Note that when the nonparametric term in capital and investment is included,
the capital coefficient can no longer be interpreted as the parameter of the pro-
duction function in the first stage of the procedure. However, given that the
coefficient on capital is of no particular interest to us, this is inconsequential for
our purposes.
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Table 5
Nonlinear Least Squares: Overall Skill Dispersion
Variable Parameter
Sample
Whole
(1)
Whole
(2)
Whole
(3)
Pre-1990
(4)
Post-1990
(5)
Overall dispersion r 1.75 1.80 1.49 1.87 1.81
(.391) (.414) (.64) (.544) (.398)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [.999] [1.00]
Labor b .766 .722 .742 .711 .731
(.019) (.019) (.007) (.0240) (.021)
Capital a .226 .257
(.015) (.006)
Estimation method NLS OP ACF OP OP
2R .87 .88 .89 .87
No. of observations 9,790 9,790 8,575 4,180 5,610
Note.—Dependent variable: log value added. Results from estimating eq. (9) with nonlinear least
squares. Estimation method: NLS is nonlinear least squares, OP is Olley and Pakes (1996), ACF is
Ackerberg et al. (2006). Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications in parentheses; prob-
ability that the parameter is greater than one (computed as the frequency of bootstrapped estimates
greater than one) in brackets. Observations are weighted according to the sampling weights (see the main
text for details). All regressions include year, two-digit sector dummies, and four macro-region dummies.
regressors in the nonlinear estimation procedure, which makes the com-
putation of standard errors problematic, we base our inference on
blocked bootstrap (i.e., sampling full firm histories rather than single
observations) with 1,000 replications.
We start by estimating equation (9) where we consider the overall im-
pact of dispersion on productivity, without distinguishing between oc-
cupational status. Results of the nonlinear least squares estimation are
reported in table 5. For comparability, in the first column we report the
results of simple nonlinear least squares (NLS).30 Given that the param-
eters of interest are scarcely affected, throughout we only comment on
those with the Olley-Pakes procedure. The results are in line with the
evidence of figure 6. We obtain estimates for r of 1.8 (col. 2); in no
bootstrap repetition did we obtain a value below one, which is the thresh-
old that determines substitutability (if ) or complementarity of skillsr 1 1
(if ). This implies that overall skills are substitutes and that within-r ! 1
firm dispersion is positively correlated with productivity.
The Olley-Pakes procedure assumes that labor is a perfectly variable
input. This might be a strong assumption; due to adjustment costs and
other frictions, labor might not be perfectly variable. Ackerberg et al.
(2006) propose an extension of the Olley-Pakes methodology that allows
30 The Olley-Pakes procedure requires excluding observations with zero in-
vestment. In our data, these represent less than 6% of the total, because we only
have medium and large firms. To maximize comparability between Olley-Pakes
and NLS, we exclude such observations from the latter, so that the estimates are
computed on exactly the same sample.
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for the estimation of the production function coefficients when all inputs
are not perfectly variable. The procedure entails obtaining an estimate of
the innovation to productivity, , where and isy y { a  E[a FI ] Ift ft ft ft t1 t
the information set at t, and then exploit the fact that such innovation
is by construction uncorrelated with all variables decided up to .t 1
As before, we maintain the assumption that capital is decided one period
in advance, so that is unrelated to . As far as labor is concerned,k yft ft
its lagged value belongs to the information set at and therefore ist 1
uncorrelated to . We can apply the same reasoning to the skill dis-yft
tribution terms and use their lagged values to form a set of four moment
conditions:
′E(y 7 Z )p 0, (10)ft t
where . To keep the number of re-2¯ ¯Z p [ln K ln L s (j /s )]t ft ft1 ft1 ft1 ft1
gressors manageable, we use a second-degree polynomial (with interac-
tions) in the first stage and a third-degree polynomial in to computeaft1
. We construct our GMM estimator using the identity matrix asE[a FI ]ft t1
weighting matrix. As before, we block-bootstrap standard errors.31 The
results, reported in column 3 of table 5, confirm those obtained by the
other estimation method. The coefficient on overall dispersion drops from
1.8 to 1.5 but is still well above 1; the capital and labor coefficients are
hardly affected. This makes us confident that our estimation results are
robust with respect to the estimation method.
To check for any structural break in the coefficients, we split the sample
into two time periods, pre-1990 and post-1990, and run separate regres-
sions with the Olley-Pakes procedure. We obtain very similar estimates
for r (1.87 and 1.81, respectively), which indicates that there was no
structural break in the relation between overall skill dispersion and pro-
ductivity. In particular, there is no evidence of a decrease in r, which
would make dispersion more detrimental to productivity and would
therefore foster segregation.
Table 6 reports the estimation results of equation (8), where we distin-
guish between the two occupational statuses. The estimate of the param-
eter g, governing the elasticity of substitution between P and NP, is0.12
with a large standard error (.9). Despite the imprecise estimation, the
estimates are below one in almost 90% of the bootstrap replications. This
suggests that P and NP workers’ skills are imperfect substitutes. According
to this point estimate, the elasticity of substitution between P and NP
workers is .89. This value is lower than the preferred estimates for skilled
31 We have experimented with the optimal weighting matrix, obtaining similar
point estimates but rather larger standard errors.
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Table 6
Nonlinear Least Squares: Skill Dispersion Within and Between
Occupational Status Groups
Variable Parameter
Sample
Whole
(1)
Whole
(2)
Whole
(3)
Pre-1990
(4)
Post-1990
(5)
Between dispersion g .590 .118 .242 .002 .186
(.791) (.900) (.585) (1.178) (.886)
[.031] [.112] [.037] [.231] [.106]
Production
dispersion Pr 1.55 1.42 1.56 1.49 1.36
(.268) (.276) (.441) (.388) (.380)
[.988] [.931] [.995] [.961] [.753]
Nonproduction
dispersion NPr 5.10 5.55 5.11 5.84 5.51
(.691) (.786) (.615) (1.376) (842)
[1.00] [1.00] [.997] [1.00] [1.00]
Labor b .766 .718 .741 .710 .723
(.019) (.018) (.008) (.023) (.020)
Capital a .225 .260
(.015) (.007)
Estimation method NLS OP ACF OP OP
2R .88 .88 .90 .87
No. of observations 9,790 9,790 8,575 4,180 5,610
Note.—Dependent variable: log value added. Results from estimating eq. (8) with nonlinear least
squares. Estimation method: NLS is nonlinear least squares, OP is Olley and Pakes (1996), ACF is
Ackerberg et al. (2006). Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications in parentheses; prob-
ability that the parameter is greater than one (computed as the frequency of bootstrapped estimates
greater than one) in brackets. Observations are weighted according to the sampling weights (see the main
text for details). All regressions include year, two-digit sector dummies, and four macro-region dummies.
and unskilled labor in the literature (between 1.3 and 1.6)32 and closer to
the elasticity of substitution between P and NP workers estimated by
Manasse and Stanca (2003) to be around 0.49–0.67 for Italian manufac-
turing in the 1990s.
In terms of within-status dispersion, we find that both and areNP Pr r
greater than one, implying within-status skill substitutability, and in both
cases we accept at reasonable significance levels the null hypothesis that
the coefficient is greater than one. The value of this coefficient is sub-
stantially larger for NP than for P workers (5.5 vs. 1.4). This might be
due to the wider range of complexity of the tasks that NP workers per-
form, which increases the returns from having some high ability individ-
uals in the team and leads to “skill-stratification” (Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg 2006) among NP workers. Taken together, these results indicate
that it is optimal to have a dispersed skill composition within each oc-
cupational status group, particularly for NP workers, while matching the
average skill levels of P and NP workers.
As before, we check for the robustness of the results with respect to
32 See, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992), Johnson (1997), Krusell et al. (2000),
Ciccone and Peri (2005), and Caselli and Coleman (2006).
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the estimation procedure applying the Ackerberg et al. methodology. We
construct the six moment conditions:33
′E(y 7 Z )p 0, (11)ft t
where 2NP P 2 P¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Z p [ln K ln L s [(s  s ) /s ] (j /s )t ft ft1 ft1 ft1 ft1 ft1 ft1 ft1
. Again we find that the results are very similar to those ob-2NP ¯(j /s )]ft1 ft1
tained applying the Olley-Pakes methodology (table 6, col. 3). In partic-
ular, the estimate of g becomes more precise and, although the standard
error is still rather large, we can accept with a good degree of confidence
the hypothesis that P and NP workers are imperfect substitutes.34
Finally, in the last two columns of the table we split the sample before
and after 1990. Again, we find that the estimates of all coefficients are
extremely similar over the two periods, a further confirmation of the
absence of a structural change in the way the skill distribution enters the
production function.
We performed a number of other robustness checks. First, we ran some
reduced-form regressions in which dispersion entered linearly, and we
used alternative measures for skill dispersion such as the ratio of the 90th
to the 10th percentile of the skill distribution. The results broadly confirm
those of the structural regressions. In particular, we obtain elasticities of
value added to dispersion within each occupational status in the range of
2%–5% and of the between-status component around 1%. Second, we
reran the regressions for single-plant firms alone and also excluding man-
agers from the NP group as their inclusion could overplay the role of
dispersion. In both cases we find no qualitative change in the results. All
in all, the results of a positive impact of within-status dispersion on pro-
ductivity, especially for NP workers, and a negative impact of between-
status dispersion proved to be fairly robust.
C. Extensions
An important critique to the previous regressions is that they impose
the same coefficients for all firms. One possibility would be to run our
estimates by sectors. Unfortunately, sample size is greatly reduced when
considering single two-digit sectors, which makes the estimation prob-
lematic. An alternative is to group firms according to some other char-
33 An additional moment condition could be obtained using the lagged value
of the share of P workers. We have experimented by adding this additional con-
dition, but the results become less precise.
34 Woolridge (2005) proposes a further refinement of the Olley-Pakes procedure,
consisting in estimating contemporaneously the first and second step in a GMM
framework. In our case, this turned out to be unfeasible, as it implies running a
GMM estimation with a very large set of parameters (the basic parameters and
those of the first step procedure, which includes the interaction between all the
regressors to the second degree and the year, sector, and area dummies).
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Table 7
Nonlinear Least Squares: Sample Splits
Variable Parameter
Size ICT Intensity Tech Level
Medium
(1)
Large
(2)
ICT
(3)
NO
ICT
(4)
Medium
Low
(5)
Medium
High
(6)
Between
dispersion g .587 2.16 .406 .77 .223 .180
(.887) (1.29) (1.192) (1.190) (1.13) (1.63)
[.323] [.039] [.295] [.108] [.184] [.277]
Production
dispersion Pr 1.39 1.59 1.53 1.52 1.46 .854
(.307) (1.009) (.162) (.314) (.280) (1.22)
[.859] [.940] [.759] [.897] [.943] [.491]
Nonproduction
dispersion NPr 5.30 7.91 5.25 5.52 6.01 3.68
(.928) (1.295) (1.25) (1.042) (1.00) (1.353)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [.989]
Labor b .702 .715 .771 .693 .706 .746
(.026) (.025) (.031) (.021) (.022) (.029)
2R .74 .86 .89 .88 .87 .90
No. of
observations 5,424 4,366 3,345 6,199 6,158 3,632
Note.—Dependent variable: log value added. Results from estimating eq. (8) using the Olley-Pakes
procedure. “Medium” are firms with 50–250 employees, “large” with more than 250 employees; ICT
intensity follows the classification of O’Mahony and van Ark (2003) and technological level that of
OECD (2003). Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications in parentheses; probability that
the parameter is greater than one (computed as the frequency of bootstrapped estimates greater than
one) in brackets. Observations are weighted according to the sampling weights (see the main text for
details). All regressions include year, two-digit sector dummies, and four macro-region dummies.
acteristics. We examine the relationship between skill dispersion and
productivity along three dimensions: firm size, information and com-
munication technologies (ICT) intensity, and technological level.
The role of within-firm skill dispersion on productivity might be dif-
ferent depending on firm size. There is ample evidence that within-firm
wage dispersion rises with firm size (Davis and Haltiwanger 1996; Lal-
lemand and Rycx 2006) due to higher heterogeneity in the workforce of
the large firms, particularly for NP workers. Table 7 reports the results
of estimating equation (8) distinguishing between medium-sized firms—
less than 250 employees, which is approximately the median size of our
sample—and large firms—with more than 250 employees (we do not
observe firms with fewer than 50 employees). We find that P and NP
workers are imperfect substitutes in large firms: in 94% of the boot-
strapped replications the coefficient on the between-occupational-status
dispersion was less than one. That is, in such organizations productivity
increases when the average skills of P and NP workers are similar. By
contrast, for smaller firms, although less than one, the coefficient is very
imprecisely estimated with only a little less than 68% of the bootstrapped
estimates being less than one. At the same time, dispersion of skills within
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the group of NP workers is associated with higher productivity in both
groups, more so in large firms. This is in line with the existence of what
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) call “knowledge hierarchies” among
NP workers, which seems to be more prominent among large firms.
Another interesting dimension of firms to be considered is ICT inten-
sity. As argued above, there is some controversy in the literature on the
relationship between ICT use and the hierarchical structure of the firm.
According to the literature on ICT adoption and workplace transfor-
mation (Caroli and Van Reenen 2001; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt
2002), ICT intensive firms should have a flatter, more decentralized struc-
ture, together with a more uniform skill distribution. On the contrary,
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) suggest that to the extent that ICT
reduces the costs of communication within the firm, it might also lead to
more centralized structures. We use the taxonomy proposed by
O’Mahony and van Ark (2003) that classifies sectors according to the
intensity of usage of ICT. More precisely we break the sample into two
groups: ICT-using and non–ICT-using sectors.35 The estimation results,
shown in columns 3 and 4 of table 7, do not allow us to discriminate
between the alternative theories. In fact, we find that between-status dis-
persion is more detrimental to productivity for non-ICT firms, possibly
also because such firms are on average larger in our sample (648 vs. 548
employees), even if the large standard errors prevent clear inference. The
within-status coefficients are very similar. In general, therefore, the two
groups of firms look fairly similar in terms of the relation between skill
distribution and productivity. One possible explanation is that the process
of ICT adoption was only beginning toward the end of our study period
(Fabiani, Schivardi, and Trento 2005), so that its effects (if any) cannot
be detected in our data. This is also in line with the stability of the
production function coefficient found for the pre- and post-1990 period.
Finally, we have also checked for differences according to the tech-
nological level (OECD 2003), distinguishing between low- and medium-
low tech on one side and medium-high and high tech on the other.36 In
this case, we find that between status has a similar impact for the two
groups, while the within-status coefficients are smaller for the high-tech
firms, particularly for NP workers. Consistently with the O-ring theory
of production, this might be due to the fact that in such firms more NP
workers perform nonroutine tasks, such as R&D, product development,
and so forth, so that a less dispersed skill composition is preferable.
35 We leave out the category ICT-producing sectors, as it amounts to less than
300 observations, too few to obtain stable estimates.
36 Unfortunately, the relatively low specialization of Italian firms in high-tech
sectors is reflected in the small number of observations in the latter group, so
that such results should be interpreted with care.
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D. Discussion
The regression results are fairly clear cut, and they agree with the graph-
ical evidence in figure 6. By and large, they suggest that for a given average
skill level, a firm’s productivity is higher the more dispersed the skill
distribution of its labor force. When distinguishing between occupational
status groups, productivity is associated with a disperse distribution
within status. The effect is very strong for NP workers ( in ourNPr p 5.5
preferred estimate) and less so for P workers, for which deviation from
perfect substitutability ( ) is not too large: in fact, we estimaterp 1
. The reverse holds between status groups: the more productivePr p 1.4
firms tend to have P and NP workers of similar average skill levels. This
conclusion will have to be corroborated by further evidence, as the es-
timates of the between-status coefficients are imprecise. However, to the
extent that P and NP workers perform tasks that are fundamentally dif-
ferent but correlated in terms of complexity, skill self-matching across
occupational status groups appears sensible. This suggests that some other
firm attributes, such as the complexity or the technological content of the
products, determines the optimal average skills of P and NP workers.
These results are in line with the theoretical models on firm hierarchies
of Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006), who predict that high-
ability managers work with high-ability P workers, but also with strat-
ification of skills within occupational categories, particularly managers
and more generally NP workers. According to these theories, given the
wider range of tasks that NP workers perform, and their asymmetric
importance, it is optimal to have “knowledge hierarchies” in which the
knowledge of senior personnel is leveraged with less skilled staff. That
is, the most straightforward and standardized tasks are assigned to less
skilled workers, while the high-ability ones are reserved for problem
solving and decision making. This type of organization accords with a
hierarchical and more centralized view of the firm, where production
depends on the skills of workers with decisional power.
Overall, our findings do not square with the “Microsoft versus
McDonald’s” organizational mode but are a better fit with the “Fiat versus
Ferrari” dichotomy. Both Fiat and Ferrari are vertically integrated firms
and do all phases of the production process in house, from R&D to design
to assembly line production.37 Therefore, both are likely to have a dis-
persed skill distribution, consistent with our finding that the within-firm
component explains most of the overall skill dispersion. Second, the dif-
ferent technological content of the products (luxury and racing cars in
37 This is particularly remarkable in the case of Ferrari, whose racing department,
unlike other companies, has always produced both engines and chassis of racing
cars. This does not mean that the two companies do not subcontract single com-
ponents; on the contrary, both make extensive use of subcontracting.
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the case of Ferrari and family cars in the case of Fiat) explains the fact
that Ferrari has better engineers and better mechanics than Fiat. This is
also in line with the optimality of matching the average skill level of P
and NP workers. Third, according to case studies in the managerial lit-
erature, at least for Fiat during our sample period, the organizational mode
was hierarchical, which might have benefited from a dispersed skills mix.38
This contrasts with a series of studies for France and the United States
(Caroli and Van Reenen 2001; Bresnahan et al. 2002), showing that the
ICT revolution decentralized decision-making power and reduced the
number of hierarchical levels. At least up to the late 1990s, there is no
evidence of these more decentralized organizational modes in Italian
manufacturing.
VI. Conclusion
We have assembled a matched employer-employee data set for Italy to
analyze the distribution of workers’ skills within and between firms and
its relation to firms’ productivity. We first conduct a variance decom-
position exercise, which reveals that most of the dispersion of skills takes
place within firms and not between them. We find no significant change
in this pattern between 1981 and 1997. Thus, unlike other studies for the
United States, France, and the United Kingdom, we find no evidence of
a tendency toward skill segregation. Second, we find that the dispersion
within occupational groups (P and NP workers) is positively correlated
with firm productivity, while differences in the average skill levels of P
and NP workers tend to have a negative impact, even if the evidence is
less conclusive on this aspect. This suggests a production process in which
it is optimal to match P and NP workers of similar average skills while
having a dispersed distribution of skills within each occupational status
group. We argue that this evidence is consistent with a hierarchical or-
ganization of the firm in which it is optimal to concentrate skills in in-
dividuals with decision-making and supervisory power, on which the
firm’s performance is heavily dependent.
An important question is whether our results extend outside the man-
ufacturing sector. To the extent that NP workers are more prominent in
services, one could argue that our conclusion on the importance of within-
status dispersion might be even stronger in that sector. At the same time,
the great diversity of activities performed in services implies that it is very
hard to draw general inference on this question without direct evidence:
38 Tronti (1997, 37) reports interviews with Fiat executives who say that it was
not until the late 1990s that the company pursued “a new organizational mode
based on participation with respect to the previous one, which had been based
on hierarchical power” (translation is our own).
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only further research that extends the analysis outside manufacturing will
provide us with insights on how general these patterns may be.
In terms of policy, the results can be taken to give both positive and
negative news on the evolution of Italian manufacturing over the last 20
years. The lack of an increase in segregation implies that productivity,
and therefore income, of the low-skilled workers continues to benefit
from workplaces with a dispersed skill distribution. On the other hand,
if segregation occurs within a process that increases productivity by re-
organizing production, then up to the late 1990s Italian manufacturing
firms show no sign of participating in this transformation. This inter-
pretation is supported by more recent evidence on the slow-paced ICT
diffusion and new organizational modes in the last 10 years in the Italian
economy, as well as the disappointing productivity trend since the mid-
1990s.
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